November 5, 2026
I come to this conversation from several places at once: as Program Director for Natural Resource Governance, as someone who worked with the International Mining for Development Centre (IM4DC), and as a Black woman from Malawi who has seen the extractives sector from both donor and country perspectives. These experiences have taught me five lessons: political windows shape funding, momentum shapes priorities, geography is not neutral, impact is difficult to measure, and philanthropy must be clear about its role. These reflections draw on government, philanthropic and development funding, with a final focus on philanthropy's unique role.
1. Political windows shape funding
One of the clearest lessons for me is that funding does not move only because a problem is important. It often moves because a political window opens.
International Mining for Development Centre (IM4DC) is a useful example. Established in 2011 as part of Australia’s broader Mining for Development Initiative, the AU$31 million centre was designed to help developing countries better govern their extractive industries in support of economic growth and poverty reduction. Its launch also coincided with Australia’s intensified engagement with Africa during its successful campaign for a 2013–14 United Nations Security Council seat, a period in which African votes became increasingly important to Australia’s multilateral diplomacy. This does not mean IM4DC was only, or even primarily, a diplomatic instrument. African governments were seeking practical support on mining governance, regulation, fiscal management, environmental oversight and technical capability – areas where Australia had recognised expertise. This was a moment when diplomatic interests, technical demand and expertise, and political timing converged to produce action.
Such convergence is not unique to Australia. The Canadian International Resources and Development Institute (CIRDI) offers a parallel example. Established in 2013 to help resource-rich developing countries strengthen natural resource governance through policy, regulation, training, technical assistance and applied research, this initiative likely proceeded because it aligned with Canada’s broader economic diplomacy and the global reach of its mining sector.
More broadly, the early 2010s saw several donor governments establish mining-for-development programs focused on governance and capacity building. Australia's IM4DC, Canada's CIRDI and United Kingdom’s Extractive Hub reflected a broader recognition that extractive governance mattered for development outcomes. Yet despite their shared objectives and overlapping geographies, these programs largely operated in parallel. Opportunities to harmonise approaches, coordinate investments and build on one another's strengths were often missed, resulting in some duplication, overlaps and gaps in support.
Over the past five years, mining governance has been reframed through energy security, industrial policy, supply chain resilience, geopolitical competition from the Minerals Security Partnership launched in 2022, the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act in 2024, and the rise of government-to-government critical minerals agreements.
For actors working in this space, the question is: how can they recognise political windows and be ready to act when they open?
By preparing ideas before the window opens
By staying connected and front of mind with decision-makers
By building coalitions that can move quickly
This matters because opportunities often arrive quickly – a short turn around request for a proposal shaped by government priorities, an invitation to advise on a policy agenda, or a need to respond to a live negotiation. Governments often have a strong appetite for new announcements. The actors best placed to influence them are usually those who have already done the thinking, built the relationships with government and can clearly explain why their ideas matter now. Just as importantly, there is opportunity for producer countries to create political windows of their own, using continental and regional platforms to turn critical minerals into a broader political project.
2. Momentum can matter as much as merit
I have learnt that issues become fundable when they become legible. They need a story, a constituency, a number, and often a champion.
Illicit financial flows are a good example. The African Union/UNECA High Level Panel chaired by former South African President Thabo Mbeki helped make illicit financial flows (IFFs) a continental and global issue, estimating that Africa was losing around US$50 billion annually through illicit flows. The report helped turn a complex set of tax, trade, secrecy, corruption, and corporate practices into a compelling development narrative: money was leaving the continent that should have been available for public goods.
This is how topics become ‘trendy’ in development. They are not always new, but they become fundable when they are framed in ways that fit the moment. A good issue gains traction when it has evidence, political champions, a moral argument, and a practical menu of interventions.
The risk is herd behaviour: once an issue has momentum, many actors move towards it, sometimes at the expense of slower, less visible but equally important work. In mineral governance, that can mean more attention to globally resonant themes – critical minerals, climate and supply chains – and less to the patient work of strengthening institutions, local accountability, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) realities, subnational governance and long-term public administration.
For funders, the opportunity is to engage momentum strategically without being captured by it; backing new windows where they can accelerate reform, while also providing the patient support that sustains deeper governance work when political attention moves on. The real measure is whether a trend strengthens the underlying system or simply creates another wave of activity that disappears when the spotlight shifts.
3. Geography is never just geography
Funding geography often looks technical from the outside: priority countries, eligibility criteria, regional strategies, mineral potential. But I have come to learn that in practice, geography is also shaped by relationships, institutional memory, risk appetite, and individual champions.
Malawi is a useful example for me personally. It can sometimes be a ‘donor darling’ – small and poor enough to be knowable, reform-minded enough to be attractive, and relationally accessible to external partners. But that raises harder questions: is the level of investment enough to help the country get to a fundamentally stronger place? What does Malawi need to fund and define for itself? What should be externally supported? And how should countries like Malawi position themselves so they are not only responding to donor priorities, but shaping the terms of engagement?
The same question applies elsewhere. Why does one geography move in and out of scope, while others such as Papua New Guinea or Solomon Islands receive uneven attention despite clear governance relevance?
The answer is rarely only about mineral potential or need. It is also about who is in the room, who has relationships, who feels familiar to the institution, and where a funder believes it can operate with confidence.
Funders should:
Start with the governance problem rather than a fixed country list – that means asking where funding can genuinely add value, whether support is enough to matter,
Consider additionality and scale
Balance investments across established and emerging producers
Look beyond familiar donor networks
Avoid allowing geopolitical or commodity trends to narrow the focus
Be transparent about how geographic choices are made
Recognise that early investment in emerging producer may have outsized influence because laws, institutions and industry practices are still being shaped
Producer countries can improve their visibility by:
Presenting clear reform opportunity
Linking mineral governance to national priorities
Demonstrating political and institutional ownership beyond a single champion
Identifying credible local partners and practical entry points
Using regional and global platforms strategically
Showing how modest support could catalyse stronger rules, institution and public participation
Ultimately, producer countries should not have to master the funder language to deserve attention; funders also have a responsibility to seek out less visible jurisdictions and question whether their geographic choices are reinforcing existing inequalities in funding and influence.
4. Measuring impact is messy
We all know that mineral governance and systems change are hard to measure. The work is long-term, political and rarely linear. Even defining ‘impact’ is difficult. What are we actually measuring? Better laws, stronger institutions, degree of environmental and social harms, increased revenues, reduced corruption, improved community outcomes, greater trust, more equitable benefit-sharing, or a more informed public debate?
I have learnt that the answer will differ depending on whether you ask a funder, a government official, a civil society organisation, a community leader or a reformer inside the system.
In the NRG program, we tried to measure contribution in ways that made sense for systemic work – from governments and businesses adopting proven approaches, to communities using information to influence decisions, to cross-sector collective action on governance issues. But it also surfaced the central challenge of this work: some changes can be seen in policies, practices or community outcomes, while others are harder to trace. In areas like beneficial ownership, open data or institutional reform, the pathway from governance change to tangible benefits for citizens can be long, indirect and difficult to prove within a funding cycle.
This suggests that measurement should not only focus on whether a grant achieved a neat outcome. It should also ask whether the conditions for meaningful work were strengthened including whether partners had time to build trust, flexibility to respond to political openings, support to take principled risks, and enough institutional stability to stay with difficult work beyond a funding cycle. It also means measuring funders themselves. Were we good partners? Did we provide patient capital or create short-term pressure? Did we reduce transaction costs, give partners room to lead, and provide political cover when the work was sensitive, contested or slow?
In fields like mineral governance, the quality of the funding relationship is not separate from impact, it is part of what allows impact to happen.
5. What Part of the Governance Stack Is Philanthropy Willing to Hold?
Philanthropies often talk about comparative advantage or adjacent ideas such as complementarity, added value, catalytic capital and division of labour. The concepts are real, but a lesson for me is that in practice, funding decisions are also shaped by internal incentives, bureaucratic procedures, leadership preferences, risk appetite, political sensitivities and operational constraints. As a recent mineral governance funding scan highlighted, internal factors often shape what gets funded. Even within these institutional realities, what should philanthropy be willing to fund that government aid, commercial capital or multilateral finance cannot or will not?
Mining already understands the idea of a capital stack: grants, concessional capital, debt and equity each carry different expectations about risk, return, timing and control. But in mineral governance, we rarely ask the equivalent question: what is the governance stack? Who funds community voice during exploration or before conflict becomes visible? Who pays for data systems, public-interest journalism, civil society capacity, independent watchdogs and legal support when the political environment becomes difficult? Who stays after a law is passed to support implementation, enforcement, public scrutiny and institutional learning?
This is where risk appetite becomes practical rather than rhetorical. Philanthropy often claims a comparative advantage because it can be more flexible, patient and willing to support politically sensitive or unproven work than many public funders. If that it is true, individual philanthropies should be clear about which parts of the governance stack they are willing to hold: early-stage work before there is a policy window, politically sensitive accountability work, slow implementation after announcements have moved on, and or the connective tissue between communities, reformers, researchers and institutions. Just as important is coordination. No single philanthropy can support the entire governance stack, making collective action essential to avoid gaps, duplication and fragmented support.
Closing reflection
What I have learnt about mineral governance funding is that the field is never only about mining. It is about politics, institutions, narratives, geography, relationships and time. It is also about power: who defines the problem, whose evidence counts, whose risks are carried, and whose priorities become fundable.
That does not make funding less valuable. But it does call for more honesty.
If funders want to support better mineral governance, we need to be clearer about our own incentives, more disciplined about political windows and better prepared to act when they open, more attentive to the narratives we amplify, humbler about impact, and more explicit about the part of the governance stack we are willing to hold.
The opportunity is not simply to fund better projects. It is to back the conditions that allow better governance to emerge: capable institutions, informed communities, credible evidence, trusted intermediaries, public scrutiny, and reformers who can act when windows open. And in the current critical minerals moment, it also means recognising that producer governments, institutions and civil society should not only be responding to global agendas; they should be shaping political windows that advance their own priorities.
In the end, mineral governance is not just a technical challenge for resource-rich countries. It is also a mirror held up to funders – showing us what we prioritise, what we avoid, what risks we transfer to others, and what we are genuinely willing to back when the work is slow, contested and difficult to claim.
The author used Microsoft CoPilot as a drafting and editing partner in developing this piece; the experiences, analysis and views expressed are their own.