At first glance, fiscal oversight systems seem to be functioning well. Across countries, year after year, budgets are tabled. Hearings are held. Audits are published. Civil society organizations launch reports and campaigns. And the media covers it all. All too often, though, this performance masks dysfunction. Across much of the world, fiscal oversight is more pantomime than power—rarely shifting real decisions or resource flows.
As democratic erosion and inequality deepen around the world, the institutions tasked with overseeing public resources are often underpowered, underfunded, and overlooked. If democracy is to flourish, it must be grounded in real accountability—not just rhetoric. That demands a rethinking of fiscal accountability, including the actors involved and how they relate to each other.
The Illusion of Oversight
National budgets are often unveiled with public fanfare: televised speeches, plenary debates and glossy documents. But, in most cases the key decisions have already been made behind closed doors in finance ministries or through quiet lobbying by powerful interests. Legislatures are left to rubber-stamp budget proposals they can’t—or won’t—meaningfully change. Audit reports are published but often ignored and civil society remains largely shut out of the process.
This is no accident. It reflects a structural imbalance that concentrates power in the hands of a few, while sidelining a growing number of relevant actors. Although the executive, legislature, and auditors retain constitutionally defined roles, the budget arena has broadened. New oversight bodies - such as Parliamentary Budget Offices, fiscal councils, Ombuds offices and anti-corruption bodies – are emerging. Non-state actors, including political parties, mass-based organizations, and the media are gaining influence. International actors like donors, multilateral banks, credit ratings agencies, and global NGOs are also increasingly active in national fiscal processes.
Yet, over the past 30 years, public finance reforms—often shaped by New Public Management (NPM) principles—have further centralized control within Ministries of Finance, weakening external oversight and leaving accountability actors struggling to keep pace. Ironically, these are the very institutions that must be strengthened to confront today’s governance challenges.
To explore this dilemma, this post focuses on the three core accountability actors found across most countries: legislatures, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs), and civil society organizations (CSOs).
Legislatures: Constitutional Guardians, Politically Constrained
As “keepers of the purse”, legislatures are constitutionally mandated to approve budgets, scrutinize spending, and oversee audit follow-up. They are intended to serve as key agents of fiscal accountability—vertically (to citizens), horizontally (with oversight bodies), and diagonally (via civil society). To do so, legislatures must facilitate debate, balance national and local interests, analyse policies and track expenditures, partner with other accountability actors, and, when necessary, hold the executive to account.
In practice, however, legislatures face serious constraints that often prevent them from living up to these expectations. For instance:
Treasury dominance: Reforms concentrating fiscal authority in the executive to promote fiscal discipline and efficiency can lead to legislative oversight being ignored or undermined.
Political systems and incentives: Party loyalty, polarization, and institutional design can weaken legislatures’ ability – and willingness – to hold the executive accountable. In some cases, these factors can lead legislatures to misuse their fiscal powers, prioritize pork-barrel allocations and enable inefficiencies.
Restrictive powers and processes: Many legislatures lack the power, time and flexibility in budget debates to influence budgets meaningfully.
Institutional capacity: Legislatures often lack timely access to useful fiscal data, independent analytical support, and a well-functioning committee system.
Fragmentation and collective pressure: Siloed structures, with little or no collaboration with other accountability actors, constrains the legislature’s ability to mobilize collective pressure on the executive.
Despite these pressures, interesting innovations are emerging. Parliamentary Budget Offices now support legislatures in South Korea, South Africa, Uganda and elsewhere. India adjusted timelines to allow for earlier presentation and longer discussion of its budget, while Georgia enables reviews of medium-term spending. Chile and Ukraine use media and digital tools to broadcast legislature sessions and enable real-time monitoring. Even public participation mechanisms are slowly spreading.
Yet, Ministries of Finance still overshadow legislatures. While strong legislatures alone can’t guarantee accountability, weak ones make accountability almost impossible. Resolving this dilemma, while also addressing legislators’ incentives for counterproductive fiscal behaviour, is vital for strengthening broader fiscal accountability.
Supreme Audit Institutions: Independence in Principle, Obstruction in Practice
SAIs hold immense potential for strengthening accountability. Studies show that audits can significantly reduce corruption, improve compliance, and enhance trust—especially in societies where scepticism of government runs high. Yet, many SAIs fall short of this ideal.
Whether or not SAIs can live up to their potential depends mostly on political economy factors and on the institutional environment in which they are embedded. Independence from the executive is key. However, the latest Global SAI Stocktaking Report 2023 finds that SAI independence levels have declined for the third consecutive time. Common issues include political interference in appointments, management, publications, and budgets. When SAIs dig too deep or publish uncomfortable truths, they may face retaliation or removal from office, as has happened in Sierra Leone. In other cases, the intrusions are less visible but no less pernicious.
Even when SAIs do their jobs well, their findings often go unheeded. Too often, reports get tabled, committees discuss, recommendations are made—and then nothing happens. Executives delay action or ignore advice. Legislatures have no enforcement powers and little incentive to do so. Reinforcing these limitations, SAIs often operate with insufficient resources and skilled staff to undertake their work.
Nevertheless, change is underway. During the COVID-19 pandemic, several SAIs stepped up to audit emergency spending and reveal misuse. Others now publish simplified audit guides and reports, collaborate with civil society to choose sites and undertake audits, and partner with media outlets to broadcast findings. In South Africa the Auditor-General increasingly works with the courts to enhance pressure for the executive acting on audit recommendations. Meanwhile, SAIs continue to deepen their support to legislatures by supplementing analytical support, prioritizing and simplifying reporting, and directly following up with the executive.
These shifts signal a growing recognition that accountability must be a shared effort.
Civil Society and The Media: Moving in from the Margins
Over the past two decades, civil society has become an increasingly dynamic actor in the fiscal ecosystem. In more than 100 countries, communities, organizations, and think tanks now regularly scrutinize budgets and revenue proposals, formulate alternative policies, expose corruption, mobilize citizens, and help improve public services.
CSOs have expanded access to budget information, trained legislators, helped auditors communicate findings, shaped policies, and partnered with governments to improve services. Collaboration – within civil society and with state actors – has proven especially effective. In Brazil, coalitions blocked regressive tax proposals; in Mexico, they exposed and helped suspend elite tax breaks; and in South Africa, they secured funding for early childhood development. In Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa, cross-sector coalitions have unblocked delayed payments, uncovered ghost workers, and improved service delivery for over nine million informal dwellers, fisherfolk, women farmers, and urban poor.
Despite these successes, civil society still remains largely excluded from formal fiscal processes. The Open Budget Survey 2023 scores public participation in budget processes at an average of just 15 out of 100 across 125 countries. While access to fiscal information has improved, opportunities to act on it remain limited - skewed towards the private sector and elite think tanks. In addition to weak participation channels, CSOs are constrained by limited analytical capacity, inconsistent funding, restricted access to policymakers, and weak oversight institutions.
Just 20 years ago, civil society engagement in fiscal matters was unthinkable. Today, most major international institutions—and increasingly governments—recognize its value. CSOs, in turn, increasingly understand that working in partnership with both state and non-state actors is critical to enhancing their impact.
A closely related and equally essential actor in the fiscal accountability landscape is the media - especially investigative journalism. The media is one of the most important channels through which the public can access and engage with fiscal issues, yet the media receives little institutional support. Structural challenges, legal threats, financial instability, digital disruption, and declining public trust further undermine its role. Forging stronger alliances between journalists and other oversight actors is, therefore, key.
From Silos to Systems
Weak fiscal accountability stems not just from fragile institutions, but from fragmentation and lack of collaboration. Legislatures, auditors, and civil society traditionally operate in silos, rarely coordinating or sharing strategies among themselves or with other actors in the fiscal arena. Meanwhile, Ministries of Finance dominate the fiscal space, controlling the data, the narrative, and the power to decide.
Addressing this imbalance requires a systems approach. One in which actors collaborate strategically within an ecosystem as they work towards common objectives. Signs of this shift may already be visible. Legislatures are using audit findings and civil society analysis to strengthen scrutiny. SAIs are partnering with community groups and the media. CSOs are working with mass-based organizations, journalists, and reformers within government.
An ecosystem approach also aligns with recent trends in the literature, such as the New Public Governance (NPG) model. In contrast with the hierarchical logic of its predecessor, New Public Management, NPG emphasizes networks, collaboration, and co-produced oversight—viewing accountability as a shared responsibility built on transparency, deliberation, and mutual learning. In this model, no actor has all the answers—but together they can find solutions. Relatedly, academics like Dan Honig ( relational state capacity) and Brian Levy (socially embedded bureaucracy) are also exploring how dynamic partnerships between state and non-state actors can enhance the effectiveness of public institutions and services.
The Way Forward: Building Fiscal Ecosystems
Change is possible—but it must be intentional. That’s the premise behind the Strengthening Fiscal Ecosystems for Accountability and Equity project, a collaborative action-research initiative led by the Trust, Accountability, and Inclusion Collaborative, with research partnerships in Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa. By combining political economy research with stakeholder dialogue, the project seeks to map power dynamics, identify system gaps, and test new strategies for collaboration among actors in fiscal ecosystems.
The aim is to understand which combinations of formal and informal actors—across parliament, audit, civil society, media, and the executive—can meaningfully enhance accountability. The project also seeks to build trust, align objectives, and forge stronger partnerships among these actors to create more effective and equitable fiscal systems.
Now is the time to ask hard questions about how fiscal ecosystems can strengthen accountability and advance equity:
What is the gap between the formal mandates of accountability institutions and the actual power they exercise? Why do these gaps persist, and how do they affect accountability outcomes?
Given their internal and external constraints, how much can legislatures realistically contribute to fiscal oversight? Might the budget process be reconfigured to better utilize the comparative strengths of legislatures and other actors?
What are the relative contributions of formal and informal actors to fiscal accountability? What combinations of actors are most effective in specific contexts?
How can fiscal decision-making allow a broader set of voices to contribute to more equitable fiscal policies?
Where are the “green shoots”— emerging practices that advance accountability and equity – and how can they be identified, supported, and scaled?
Conclusion: From the Illusion of Oversight to the Reality of Accountability
The stakes for fiscal accountability and equity have never been higher. If accountability institutions remain powerless and disconnected, they risk becoming irrelevant—and democracy with them.
But there is another path. By transforming silos into ecosystems, accountability actors both inside and outside the state can become a coordinated force capable of shifting the balance of power. In this vision, oversight is not just a performance, but a practice that delivers better decisions, fairer outcomes, and stronger democratic legitimacy.
This is not a quick fix. It is a systems challenge. But it is one we can no longer afford to ignore.
You can also read the first blog in this series: Re-thinking Fiscal Governance: Introducing the “Strengthening Fiscal Ecosystems” Project
Warren Krafchik was the founding Executive Director of the International Budget Partnership. He was also a co-founder and the first civil society co-chair of the Open Government Partnership (OGP); and co-founder of the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT.) He is a South African and has worked in the fields of macro-economics and public finance for the past 30 years.
Paolo de Renzio is a public finance practitioner and scholar based in Rio de Janeiro, with more than 25 years of experience working on public finance reforms with various institutions across a number of countries. He is Senior Lecturer at the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV/EBAPE) and holds a regular visiting faculty position at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Paolo holds a Ph.D. from the University of Oxford, an MSc from the London School of Economics, and a Bachelor’s from Bocconi University in Milan, Italy.